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RECENT DECISIONS

distinct from its members. This is especially true considering that
neither theory was mentioned in the opinion. The court has, however,
been urged to adopt the entity approach to partnership law,2 and the
language of this case could be used to argue that the court is leaning
in the direction of the entity theory. The court's statement that "the
partnership . . . continued to exist" 21 (emphasis added) could be con-

strued to mean that the old partnership "entity" survived the withdrawal of a member. It is more reasonable to assume, however, that
the court still regards the partnership as an aggregate of individuals
having no recognized separate existence except for certain procedural
matters. It would follow, then, that the Adams-Jarvis partnership dissolved, wound up in accordance with the contract, and at least technically terminated, 22 and that a new partnership sprang up in its place
consisting of the two remaining members. This new partnership is
governed by the old agreement. Any change in membership, as by the
admission of a new member, will send the partnership through its tech23
nical evolution, and a new, legally distinct partnership will result.
The "continuing partnership" is a useful form of business organiza24
tion, especially for firms whose membership is constantly changing.
It would be impractical, indeed, for a firm to be forced to liquidate its
assets each time a member leaves the firm and each time a new partner
is admitted. The "continuing partnership" provides a means whereby
a firm may continue its day to day business without the impediment
of a.statutory settlement of accounts. A specific contractual provision
will eliminate the necessity of dividing the accounts receivable each
time a new member is admitted or an old member withdraws. 2 5 It is

essential, however, that careful consideration be given to the drafting
of the agreement, in order that it be kept consistent with the theory of
partnership law.

THOMAs A.

PLEIN

Evidence: Attorney-Client Privilege: Communications with Insurance Agent- In Jacobi v. Podevels,' an automobile negligence
case, both drivers testified during the trial that they were traveling at
a rate of speed below the legal limit of twenty-five miles per hour. In
a statement given to his insurance company's agent, however, respondent admitted that he was traveling at a speed of thirty miles per hour,
and also included damaging remarks concerning his lookout at the time
of the accident.
2037 MARQ. L. REv. 66 (1953).

2123
Wis. 2d at 459, 127 N.W. 2d at 404.
22
Egner v. States Realty Co., note 10 supra; 40 Am. JuR. Partnership§197 (1942).
23 Annot., 45 A.L.R. 1240 (1926) ; 40 Am. JuR. Partnership§233 (1942).
24 Millikan, The Continuing Partnership Whether and When, 28 Los ANGELES B.
BULL. 123 (1953).

Hirsh, The Medical Partnership,13 DE PAUL L. REv. 28 (1963).
123 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W. 2d 73 (1964).
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Upon cross examination, respondent admitted that he had made the
written statement indicated, and that he had used it to refresh his
recollection. Appellants' counsel requested that the statement be produced, and over objection based on privilege it was turned over and
made the basis for further cross examination. It was later shown to
the court's satisfaction that respondent's assertion of use for refreshing
his memory was incorrect; and the jury was thereupon instructed to
disregard all references to that written statement, with further cross
examination thereon being barred.
In raising the objection of privileged communication, respondent
was resting upon apparently solid legal footing. The leading case in the
area, Wojciechowski v. Baron, 2 struck an admirable parallel. There,
the defendant testified over objection that he had made a written statement, in the form of an accident report, to his insurance company. His
attorney was then required to produce the statement, timely objection
having been made. The statement was not only used for cross examination purposes, but was read into the record and was itself received
into evidence. Upon appeal, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed the ruling of the trial court, and decided to adopt the American
Law Reports rule:
According to the weight of authority, a report or other communication made by an insured to his liability insurance company, concerning an event which may be made the basis of a
claim against him covered by the policy, is a privileged communication, as being between attorney and client, if the policy requires the company to defend him through its attorney, and the
communication is intended for the information or assistance of
the attorney in so defending him. 3
This rule originated principally with Ohio case law, where the
insurance company is regarded solely as an agent to communicate information to its attorneys in the claim department, or eventually to
their trial attorney,4 and pertains even if no claim is actually ever filed
against the insured. 5 Jacobi, however, explicitly overrules the Wojiechowski decision, and with it, apparently, Wisconsin's adoption of the
rule. Justice Fairchild, in writing the decision, stated: "Recognizing
that a policy choice must be made with respect to confidentiality of
statements by an insured to the insurer, some of the members of the
court, including the writer of this opinion, would adhere to Wojiechowski v. Baron, . . . wherein the choice has previously been made by this

court."" The decision, then, was based upon a divisive policy considera2274 Wis. 364, 80 N.W. 2d 434 (1956).
322 A.L.R. 2d 660 §2.
4Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 N.E. 2d 840 (1951).
5Re Heile, 65 Ohio App. 45, 29 N.E. 2d 175 (1939).
6 23 Wis. 2d at 157, 127 N.W. 2d at 76.
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tion, which stems from Dean Wigmore's statement that "the privilege
[attorney-client] remains an exception to the general duty to disclose.
... It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is
nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the
7
logic of its principle."1

This limitation is not aimed directly at the attorney-client privilege,
however, since it is statutorily established." It is directed, rather, at
restricting agencies through which an attorney may operate. In commenting on communications to an agent of the attorney, Dean Wigmore himself states:
It has never been questioned that the privilege protects communications to the attorney's clerks and his other agents (including stenographers) for rendering his services. The assistance of these agents being indispensible to his work and the communications of the client being often necessarily committed to
them by the attorney or by the client himself, the privilege must
include all the persons who act as the attorney's agents. 9 (Footnotes omitted.)
The original purpose of the attorney-client privilege, of course, was
to foster free disclosure in order to protect the client. It is his privilege
and is the oldest of all forms of privileged communication. The employment of agents, on the other hand, seems to be the prerogative of
the attorney. To reach the conclusion of Jacobi, it would seem to be
necessary to find either that the insurance company is exclusively the
agent of the client, or that the legal department is not actually employed by the insured until an action is actually instigated. The argument in either instance seems to be circuitous, since either would of
necessity alter the status quo. If the company were solely the agent of
the client, it would disregard the terms of employment of the legal staff,
which delegates the responsibility of fact finding to the insurance company; whereas if the legal staff were not considered as employed until
litigation, it would disregard the contractual clause binding the company to furnish proper defense for the policy holder.
The Jacobi reasoning was initially established in New York, where
dicta indicated that there could be no privilege if only an insurer-in-sured relationship existed at the time the statement was made, even if
it were to come into the hands of an attorney at a later date."' This
position was definitely refuted, however, in the case of Hollien v. Kaye"
7 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
s WIs. STAT. §32522 (1961) : "An attorney or counselor at law shall not be al-

lowed to disclose a communication made by his client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of his professional employment."
9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, §2301, at 583.
10 Cote v. Knickerbocker, 160 Misc. 658, 290 N.Y.S. 483 (1936).
11 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 782 (1949).
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where it was decided that the privilege obtained even before an attorney
was appointed, as being ultimately intended for the attorney. "[T]hat
defendants did not select their own counsel is of no moment ....

The

carrier stood in the position of an agent of these defendants to select
and retain their attorney for them."' 12 It then seems most apparent that
the insurance company is not only the agent of the insured, but also of
the attorney, especially when his employment is immediate rather than
prospective.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence treating privileged communications between an attorney and his client define "communication" as including advice given by the lawyer in the course of representing his
client, and also "disclosures of the client to a representative, associate
3
or employee of the lawyer incidental to the professional relationship.'
If the "carrier stood in the position of an agent of these defendants to
select and retain their attorney for them,"' 4 it would seem that any
disclosures made to them would be "incidental to the professional relationship" with the attorney.
The liberal attitude in the area of admissibility, originally stated in
1858 by Justice Best, 5 espoused by Dean Wigmore, 16 and now adopted
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, seems to be a carryback to this state's
original judicial holding on the subject of privileged communications,
wherein it was stated that "in order to give that character [privilege]
to a communication, it must be made to the counsel, attorney or solici17
tor, acting for the time being in the character of legal advisor."'
Although this drift runs contrary to the trend of modern legal thinking,' it is greatly akin to the prevalent English rule with regards to
statements made to agents of attorneys.
In England,' the concept of privilege includes all documents made
by or for counsel with a view toward litigation.
Reports by a company's servant, if made in the ordinary
course of routine, are not privileged, even though it is desirable
that the solicitor should have them and they are subsequently
sent to him; but if the solicitor has requested that such documents shall always be prepared for his use and this was one of
the reasons why they were prepared, they need not be disclosed.' 9
If it is possible to conclude from the instant decision that an insurance company's agent nmy still be retained as an agent of an attorney, the answer to the problem becomes quite clear. The individual
12Id., 87 N.Y.S. 2d at 785.
13 UioRi
RULE OF EVIDENCE 26 (3) (b).
4
' Hollien v. Kaye, 87 N.Y.S. 2d at 785.
15 Broad v. Pitt, 1 Mood & Malk 233, 234, 173 Eng. Rep. 1142, 1143 (C.P. 1828):
"The privilege is an anomaly, and ought not to be extended."
16 See WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 7.
17 Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 406, 409 (1854).
is See authorities cited notes 3, 4, 5, and 11 supra.
29 ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTIcE 264 (12th ed. 1939).
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insured may consult his own attorney before filing the required statement with his. insurer. The attorney, in turn, could then notify the insurance company and request that they collect information for him
from his client concerning his part in the questioned transaction. This
would seem to satisfy the requirement of actual employment of the
attorney by the client and of the agent by the attorney. If, in fact, the
Wisconsin decision will make demands similar to those of England,
their satisfaction would require only a blanket request from the attorney
for the client as soon as the client purchases his policy. This may place
the additional requirement upon the parties, however, that the client's
personal attorney represent him in any ensuing action, lest the transaction be labelled a sham, designed solely to circumvent the law.
A second and simpler solution seems more apparent, and should
be popular with both insurance companies and practitioners. It would
allow the insurance company to simply name an attorney on its own
staff to the case as soon as it arises, instead of waiting until litigation
is imminent. Any statements then made would be privileged as having
been made to an agent of the attorney. This would not seem to be as
satisfactory legally, however, in view of the circular agency problem
discussed earlier; viz., that the company may be considered solely as
the agent of the client rather than as the agent of the attorney.
The seed of veracity, at any rate, is
a mandatory inference from
the language of the court: "At any rate, no counsel had been assigned
to advise and defend Jacobi. If the latter were the case, a claim of
privilege could even more reasonably be made, or a claim that the work
product of an attorney was involved.

' 20

(Footnote omitted.)

In the strictest terms, however, the court would still be reluctant
to find that the insurer's agent is necessarily the insured's agent. This
conclusion is based primarily upon the contention that if the statement
is false, it can be considered as a foundation for a claim of noncooperation by the company against the insured. If, on the other hand, any
facts included in the disclosure can be used as a defense against the
insurer's liability to the insured, such facts may be used by the company itself against its own customer. It would not, then, be the agent
of the client at this stage of development. The argument then could be
maintained that although the insurance agent is the attorney's agent
as well, at that point of the proceedings the attorney is not the client's,
but only the company's attorney. To say he was the attorney of both
would place him in a position of conflicting interests in light of the cited
arguments. The legality of either possible solution to the new problem
remains to be judicially determined.
MICHAEL D. BATmHUiN
20

23 Wis. 2d at 155, 127 N.W. 2d at 75.

